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1 Introduction
Ongoing massive liquidity injections by the U.S. central bank are raising fears of significant
long-run inflation and, with it, questions about the likely economic impact. Studies based
on representative-agent models of the U.S. economy typically point to a negative, monotonic
association between long-run inflation and social welfare. Most studies find that a represen-
tative household would give up some consumption to live in a zero-inflation economy, though
the deadweight loss from moderate inflation quantitatively amounts to a fraction of 1% of
consumption. Hence, from the vantage point of a representative agent the optimal policy
prescription is non-inflationary, but departures from this policy are not very costly.1
But field economies are not populated by representative agents, so distributional issues
must be taken into account. For instance, survey evidence suggests that low-income house-
holds are more concerned about inflation than wealthier households [9], and there is some
empirical support for the view that inflation is negatively associated to wealth inequality in
the U.S. (e.g., [17]). Unfortunately, only a handful of studies have focused on the impact of
inflation in heterogeneous-agent monetary economies, and the results often differ on basic
matters such as the impact on the distribution of wealth —which is the key aggregate state
variable —whether it is optimal to target low inflation and, if so, what are the welfare gains.2
We report results from a study of the impact of long-run inflation in economies where
inequality arises endogenously. We measure wealth and consumption inequality in the econ-
omy by means of Gini coefficients, by reporting some descriptive statistics (quartiles, top and
bottom percentiles) and by plotting Lorenz curves, i.e., graphic displays reporting the cu-
mulative share of a variable against the cumulative share of the population. The benchmark
model is a production economy where labor supply and portfolio choices are endogenous.
Capital is considered in an extension. Ex-ante homogeneous households hold money to trade
on spot markets and to self-insure against idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Precautionary
saving needs can also be satisfied by holding riskless debt securities that are illiquid. There
1To be precise, the optimal policy prescription is to run the so-called Friedman rule, i.e., to deflate at
the common rate of time preference, but this policy is not implemented in practice. Notice also that higher
welfare costs are found in some OECD economies; see [4].
2For examples, in [1] 10% inflation maximizes social welfare; in [16] average welfare increases in inflation
if inflation is low. In contrast, [6] and [20] report that 10% inflation is worth, respectively, 0.6% and 8% of
average consumption in the U.S.
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is no aggregate risk. In stationary equilibrium productivity shocks induce heterogeneity in
earnings, income, and wealth. Due to incomplete markets, consumption is heterogeneously
distributed and the allocation is inefficient. Long-run inflation affects the (in)efficiency of
the allocation by altering the equilibrium distributions of income, wealth, and consumption.
Inflation results from money supply expansions achieved by fully anticipated lump-sum in-
jections. In equilibrium, a 1% increase in the rate of monetary expansion raises inflation
exactly by 1%. Stationary equilibrium is studied by computing and then comparing steady
states for different inflation rates in a model calibrated to the U.S. economy.
The study makes several contributions. First, it identifies three features of an economy
that determine the distributional impact of monetary policy: financial structure, elasticity of
labor supply, and the process underlying earnings shocks. Disparities in earlier results can be
traced back to different assumptions about one or more of these features. Second, it provides
evidence of a non-linear impact of inflation on the distributions of endogenous variables.
Small departures from zero inflation have the greatest consequences because they strongly
alter the incentives to self-insure, inducing a significant drop in the size and the liquidity of
savings portfolios. Third, the study reveals that although a faster rate of monetary expansion
may reduce wealth concentration, this can magnify consumption inequality (and vice versa).
It follows that inflation-induced reductions in the concentration of wealth do not necessarily
result in improvements in average welfare. These results hold when the model is extended
to incorporate capital formation.
There is clear intuition for these findings. When labor supply and portfolio choices
are endogenous, a trade-off exists between inflation-induced consumption redistribution and
output decline. A faster rate of monetary expansion has the potential to reduce consumption
inequality by altering the distributions of wealth and income; however, it surely causes a
permanent output decline due to endogenous labor choices. This mean variance trade-off
depends in meaningful ways on the assets available to self-insure against shocks (money,
bonds), the persistence of earnings shocks, and the response of the labor supply to changes
in the real wage. The first two elements control the extent of inflation-induced reallocation of
consumption and the third affects the overall consumption loss. We report that departures
from a zero-inflation policy may raise average welfare when earnings shocks are persistent
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and the labor supply is inelastic. This helps us reconcile varying findings about the welfare-
impact of monetary expansion in models where money is the only asset (e.g., as in [16],
and [6]).
The financial structure matters for two reasons. First, inflation-induced wealth redistri-
bution is tied to the composition of savings portfolios: When money is the only asset, a faster
rate of monetary expansion acts as a progressive tax that lowers wealth inequality (as in [3]);
When bonds can be traded, wealth inequality is less affected by inflation because the rich
hold more illiquid portfolios than the poor. Second, the financial structure affects the ability
to self-insure and to relax spending constraints. Higher inflation sharply lowers consumption
of those who have tight spending constraints and cannot borrow. Shock persistence directly
affects the extent of inequality, while the labor supply elasticity affects the inflation-induced
output decline. An inelastic labor supply brings the model closer to an endowment economy
where money injections simply induce mean-preserving consumption redistributions (e.g., as
in [1] which does not have a labor supply response).
The paper proceeds with a literature review in Section 2. Section 3 presents the model,
and Section 4 presents the results from the computational analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Only a handful of studies focus on the impact of fully anticipated inflation in economies
with heterogeneity. Of these, only a very few perform a systematic investigation (i.e., very
few studies consider a wide range of inflation rates). Most studies simply compute equilibria
for two or three inflation values, usually 0%, 5% and 10%, and for a given financial struc-
ture. The study in [13], for instance, considers a pure exchange economy with a cash in
advance constraint where inflation is generated through lump-sum money creation. There
are two types of agents who can either have a high or a low endowment for the period, the
endowment state follows a Markov process and the aggregate endowment is fixed. Hence,
there is equilibrium heterogeneity in money holdings, which vary with inflation, but aggre-
gate income and aggregate consumption are fixed and independent of inflation. The paper
studies the average welfare cost of 5% and 10% inflation rates relative to an economy with
no inflation (see the transactions cost model in [10], or the inventory-theoretic model in [8],
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for more recent examples). In contrast, our study develops a systematic investigation of the
distributional impact of inflation across different financial structures.
The existing studies with more systematic investigations share some common elements.
They all consider frameworks in which money is valued, at least partly, because it allows
agents to self-insure against some idiosyncratic shock (e.g., [16], and [6]). They also typi-
cally adopt a computational methodology —and so do we. Such existing studies differ in
their motivation for money (cash-in-advance restrictions, market timing frictions, trading
constraints, and so on), and in the (un)availability of assets other than money. More im-
portantly, the reported findings often differ in several key dimensions but such differences
cannot be readily ascribed to the type of model adopted or the role played by money in
the model. Dissimilar results are reported in matching models of money, cash-in-advance
models, and models where money has only a precautionary role.
The article [1] studies optimal risk-sharing in a pure exchange economy where bonds
and money are held only for precautionary purposes. A market-timing friction ensures
agents with high endowments can only smooth consumption by holding money. Therefore,
in equilibrium only high-income agents hold money and the demand for money vanishes as
inflation gets out of hand. Positive inflation in this model ensures maximum risk-sharing,
redistributing surplus to low-income agents, because at zero nominal interest rates bonds—
which allow lending and borrowing, unlike money—are underutilized. At a zero nominal
interest rate bonds and money pay the same return, hence the allocation is as in a money-
only economy. But bonds allow borrowing, so positive inflation is optimal because it induces
a bond demand (improves risk-sharing) and redistributes income from high-income to low
income agents. The model, however, lacks a labor supply response to inflation. The central
finding is that there is a positive inflation rate that maximizes welfare: inflation as high as
10% is necessary to maximize social welfare.
The precautionary money demand model in [20] delivers an antithetic result: 10% infla-
tion is worth at least 8% of per capita consumption. This is a production economy where
agents can hold precautionary money balances, as well as capital. The model is calibrated
to match the distribution of money holdings in U.S. data by imposing random redistribution
of net wealth. In the model inflation destroys the self-insurance value of money and raises
4
the volatility of consumption for low-income households.
In a random matching model, [16] shows that some inflation can improve social welfare
because higher inflation can reduce wealth and price dispersion, but only if inflation is low.
The opposite holds if shocks are not persistent.3 In this model agents experience iid shocks
that constrain them to be buyer or seller in a period, but not both. Sellers and buyers
are randomly and bilaterally matched in every period, and bargain to exchange goods for
money. Random trading give rise to a nondegenerate distribution of money holdings and,
by virtue of the bargaining protocol assumed, prices are an increasing function of the seller’s
wealth. [6] find that the welfare-improving effect of inflation vanishes when the search model
in [16] is augmented with a market for money; inflation lowers average welfare, though the
welfare cost is small. In this model after seller-buyer matches break, agents can enter another
market by suffering fixed disutility. In that market, agents can buy or sell money. This allows
for some market-based redistribution of money to take place in each period. The positive
redistributive impact of inflation on welfare in Molico (2006) is thus substantially lessened. A
small welfare cost of inflation also emerges from the matching model in [3], which shows how
the financial structure matters a great deal for how this cost is distributed in the economy.
The model assumes two markets open in sequence and quasilinear utility, which generates
tractable equilibrium dispersion in wealth and earnings. They report that inflation does not
generate large losses in societal welfare, but the distributional impact can be severe, and
it depends on the financial sophistication of the economy. If money is the only asset, then
inflation hurts mostly the wealthier and more productive agents, while the converse holds
when agents can insure against consumption risk with assets other than money. In addition,
they demonstrate that if money is not the only asset for self-insurance, then inflation can
benefit the wealthier and harm the poorer households. Our study attempts to reconcile all
these disparities.
3Moving away from zero inflation may also lead to a concentration in the distribution of wealth in the
transaction cost model of [10]. Their study focuses on computationally studying how different transaction
cost structures alter the distributional impact of inflation.
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3 The model
Time is discrete, the horizon is infinite, and there is a continuum of ex-ante homogeneous
infinitely lived households of measure one. Each household is a single economic decision
unit composed of a shopper-worker pair. Thinking of each date as being divided into two
subperiods (beginning and end); it is assumed that the shopper and the worker from each
household are together only at the end of a period and otherwise are apart and undertake
separate economic activities. Households consume a single perishable good and geometrically
discount future consumption at rate β ∈ (0, 1). At the beginning of each period, households
operate on anonymous goods and labor markets, while they consume and operate on financial
markets only at the end of each period.
On every date t = 1, 2, ... a perishable good can be produced by a representative profit-
maximizing firm. Labor is the only factor of production. The firm is owned by households in
equal non-marketable shares and is defined by the production technology Y : R+ → R+, is
strictly increasing and concave, and satisfies the Inada conditions. Though Y is not homo-
geneous of degree one, such a feature can be recovered by adding an “entrepreneurial”factor
in fixed supply to redistribute profits as factor payments (see [15]). With this in mind, the
firm can be considered representative. It is assumed that the firm can pay the wage bill after
selling its output. However, since the shopper and the worker are apart, workers demand
monetary compensation and shoppers carry money balances.
At the start of each date, workers draw productivity shocks determining how many ef-
ficiency units of labor they can supply to the firm. For a worker from household n, let
hn,t ∈ {hL, hH} denote the amount of “effective”labor she can supply on date t per unit
of time worked, —that is, the worker in the household can have either high or low pro-
ductivity with 0 ≤ hL < hH < ∞. It is assumed that for each household n and each
date t the shock process follows a first-order Markov chain with transition probabilities
Pr[hn,t+1 = hj |hn,t = hj] = q for j = L,H and Pr[hn,t+1 6= hj|hn,t = hj ] = 1 − q. The
parameter q ∈ (0, 1) affects the persistence of the shock, which is measured by the corre-
lation coefficient 2q − 1. Labor shocks introduce ex-post heterogeneity across households.
The long-run distribution of labor productivity is invariant, with half of households having
low productivity and the other half high productivity. Denoting by ℓn,t the labor supply of
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household n on date t, the per capita supply of effective labor is Lt =
∫
n ℓn,thn,tdn so that
the per capita output supply is Y (Lt).
4
Preferences are as follows. If household n consumes cn,t ≥ 0 goods and supplies ℓn,t ≥ 0
labor on any date t, then the household’s utility is u(cn,t) − g(ℓn,t), where the function u
is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and concave, and g is convex with
g(0) = 0. A government exists that is the sole supplier of fiat currency, of which there is an
initial nominal stock M¯ > 0 evolving deterministically at gross rate π thanks to lump-sum
transfers to households at the end of each period t. A bond market opens only at the end of
each period. On t households sell or buy one-period nominal bonds (in zero net supply) that
mature on t+ 1 and pay gross interest it+1 ≥ 0. Firms’ dividends are distributed at the end
of each period. It is assumed that all parties can commit to fulfill their financial obligations
and that all economic agents are price takers.
3.1 Stationary Monetary Allocations
To set the stage for the analysis, consider the allocation selected by a planner who treats
agents identically. We call it the efficient allocation. The planner maximizes the expected
lifetime utility of a representative agent subject to the physical and technological constraints.
The optimal plan, which solves a dynamic problem, has the following characteristics (See
Supporting Materials) It is stationary, unique, and implies constant individual consumption
and individual state-contingent labor supply. Put simply, the efficient allocation perfectly
insures each household, a result that motivates our focus on stationary allocations of the
monetary economy.
Definition 1. An allocation for a monetary economy is stationary if the distribution of
consumption is time invariant and the real money stock is positive and stationary.
The efficient allocation can be decentralized by introducing a full set of contingent claims
to be initially traded. However, the economy cannot achieve the efficient allocation because
markets are assumed incomplete: Households can self-insure only with money and bonds.5
4In Section 4.3 we extend the analysis to the case of capital formation by considering Y (Lt,Kt) as being
generated by a CRS production technology with labor and capital.
5The presumption here is that frictions in financial markets prevent households from issuing a full set
of claims that are contingent on their realized productivities. The solution to the problem with complete
contingent claims is in the Supplementary Materials.
7
Notice that in a stationary monetary allocation, money market clearing implies that inflation
is pinned down by the money growth process. Let π > 0 denote the stationary growth rate
of nominal prices.
3.2 The Household’s Problem
Households maximize expected lifetime utility, and since their problem is recursive we for-
malize it with a functional equation. Let V be the value function of a household at the
start of a date after shocks are realized. Let m ≥ 0 and b ≥ b > −∞ denote the start-of-
period household’s portfolio of money and bonds, defined in real terms. Denote with a prime
variables in the following period.
Consider a stationary distribution of wealth. Because households cannot trade state-
contingent assets and can trade goods only on spot markets, then the relevant state of a
household includes current productivity and portfolio of assets. In particular, the history of
labor shocks s is relevant only if it affects the current labor shock. Hence, let (m, b, h) denote
the current state of the household.
Given (m, b, h), in an economy where the nominal price sequence grows at constant rate
π, the household’s problem is to choose (c, ℓ,m′) ≥ 0 and b′ ≥ b to maximize expected
lifetime utility. The problem has a recursive representation:
V (m, b, h) = max{u(c)− g(ℓ) + βEV (m′, b′, h′)}
s.t. c+ π(m′ + b′) ≤ wℓh+m+ bi+ ξ + τ,
c ≤ m,
(1)
where nominal variables have been normalized by the contemporaneous nominal price of
goods. The household faces two constraints. The budget constraint accounts for uses of
funds, —that is, consumption c ≥ 0 and real savings in the form of b′ ≥ b bonds and
m′ ≥ 0 money balances. The latter are adjusted by gross inflation π because both assets are
nominal. Sources of funds include wℓh income from supplying ℓh efficiency units of labor to
the market, bond interest payments bi, m real balances, a lump-sum real balance transfer
τ , and a dividend payment ξ.6 There is also a cash-in-advance constraint because the buyer
6ξ can be considered compensation to a second productive input called “entrepreneurial capital”. This
asset is in positive and identical net supply across households and is not tradable.
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must pay with money. Thus, disposable income includes b(i− 1) + ξ + τ plus earnings wℓh,
while net wealth is m+ b.
Conjecture that the function V exists and is differentiable. Let Vx :=
∂V
∂x
for x = m, b.
Let µ ≥ 0 and λ ≥ 0 be the multipliers on the first and second constraints:
u′(c)− µ− λ = 0
g′(ℓ)− µwh = 0
−πµ+ βEVm′ ≤ 0
−πµ+ βEVb′ ≤ 0
(2)
The envelope theorem implies
Vm = µ+ λ and Vb = µi, (3)
that is, the marginal value of assets reflects the marginal utility of income µ, and the marginal
utility of liquidity, λ.
The first-order conditions reveal that heterogeneity in income and consumption depends
on three elements. A household’s labor supply depends not only on its own productivity
but also on wealth through the marginal value of income µ. Consumption depends on
wealth as well as differences in the liquidity premium of money for that specific household,
u′(c)−µ. Liquidity premia will generally differ across households depending on the level and
composition of savings.
From Equation (2) and Equation (3) we have
−π[u′(c)− λ] + βE[u′(c′)] ≤ 0 (with = if m′ > 0)
−π[u′(c)− λ] + βiE[u′(c′)− λ′] ≤ 0 (with = if b′ > b).
(4)
Bonds, unlike money, cannot be immediately traded for consumption, so they are illiquid.
The expressions in Equation (4) indicate that, due to their illiquidity, bonds are held only if
they dominate money in rate of return (i.e., if they pay a positive nominal interest rate). If
money is held, then
u′(c) =
β
π
E[u′(c′)] + λ (5)
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and if b′ > b, then
i =
E[u′(c′)]
E[u′(c′)− λ′ ]
. (6)
Instead, if b′ = b, then i < E[u
′(c′)]
E[u′(c′)−λ′]
. Given uninsurable income shocks, the economy will
generally exhibit heterogeneity in consumption, income, and wealth. Households will differ
also in the composition of their portfolios. While an analytical characterization of stationary
monetary outcome is beyond the scope of this paper, the following Lemma provides some
useful results.
Lemma 1. In a stationary monetary outcome, the following must hold: (i) m′ > 0 so that
Equation (5) always holds; (ii) λ > 0 for at least some household; (iii) if i ≤ 1, then b′ = b;
and (iv) if b′ > b, then E[λ′] > 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In a stationary monetary economy, every household holds a positive fraction of their
savings in cash. Though not everyone may hold bonds, which are illiquid, those who do
hold bonds will never hold “enough”money to satisfy any desired consumption level. In fact,
those who trade on the bond market will optimally choose money balances that leave them
liquidity-constrained in at least some possible future state. Put differently, when nominal
interest rates are positive, no household will fully self-insure against all their possible future
liquidity needs; if this were not the case, then lenders should optimally consume more today
and accumulate less wealth, while borrowers should borrow even more (see equation (6)).
To understand these results, consider that in this economy savings fulfill a precautionary
need. Households are subject to uninsurable income shocks, which expose them to income
risk. Though income cannot be spent on contemporaneous consumption, it can be saved
for future purchases. A low income shock may constrain future consumption levels because
it restricts current monetary savings. Therefore, households in this economy will generally
want to hold extra savings as a precaution against low income shocks. Since households
want to maximize the return from savings, wealthier households in general will hold only a
fraction of their savings in cash. In particular, no household will optimally hoard enough
cash to be unconstrained in their consumption in every possible state.
Availability of a bond market improves the efficiency of the allocation for two reasons.
First, the option to buy bonds reduces the opportunity cost of holding precautionary savings.
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This especially matters to wealthy households who would otherwise be affected by a large
inflation tax. Second, the option to sell bonds reduces the need to hold precautionary savings.
This especially matters to poor households, which are more likely to be constrained. In the
event of a low income shock, these households can spend all their current cash savings on
consumption, and borrow money for future consumption by selling bonds. As a result,
opening a bond market will increase the velocity of money because a smaller portion of the
money supply is kept idle, and it will also mitigate the impact of low-productivity shocks
on spending patterns. In turn, this should improve consumption smoothing and reduce
consumption inequality.
Optimality of the firm’s labor demand choice implies that in a stationary outcome the
firm demands labor L that satisfies w = F ′(L). The firm distributes revenues in excess of
labor compensation as dividends ξ = Y (L)− wL.
3.3 The Distribution of Savings and Stationary Equilibrium
Let the state of a household be denoted ω := (m, b, h) ∈ Ω := M ×B×H , with M = [0,∞),
B = [b,∞), and H = {hl, hh}. Let P(H) denote the power set of H, B(M) and B(B) denote
the Borel σ−algebra ofM and B, respectively. Let B(Ω) := B(M)×B(B)×P(H) and define
the subset of possible states B(Ω) := (M,B,H) ⊆ B(Ω). Finally, let {Ω,B(Ω),Φ} define the
probability space, where Φ is a probability measure.
Given current productivity, h ∈ H , p(h′|h) denotes the conditional probability of reaching
h′ ∈ H next period. The evolution of the distribution of the state ω can be characterized
using a transition function Q : Ω× B(Ω)→ [0, 1] defined by
Q(ω,B(Ω)) =


∑
h′∈H
p(h′|h) if (m′(ω), b′(ω)) ∈M× B,
0 otherwise
for all ω ∈ Ω and all B(Ω) ⊆ B(Ω). Put simply, the function Q allows us to calculate the
probability of realizing any level of productivity h′ ∈ H tomorrow, given that (i) today’s state
is ω ∈ Ω and given that (ii) tomorrow’s portfolios are restricted to be an element of (M,B).
In particular, if portfolios are not in (M,B), then the function Q assigns probability zero
to reaching the set of productivity H. Let φ denote the joint probability density associated
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with the probability space B(Ω). It is a mixed density, with a discrete random variable h
and two continuous random variables, m and b. Given the transition function defined in Q,
the law of motion for the probability measure Φ is given by
Φ′(B(Ω)) =
∑
h
∫
m
∫
b
Q(ω,B(Ω))φ(ω)dmdb.
A stationary monetary equilibrium is a time-invariant distribution of consumption, labor
supplies, real money balances, and real bond holdings across the population of households,
such that on each date the optimal plan of a household in state ω = (m, b, h) ∈ Ω involves
c(ω) consumption, ℓ(ω) labor, m′(ω) and b′(ω) monetary and bonds savings, respectively,
that solve the household problem (1), given that wages maximize the firm’s profit, that all
markets clear (goods, money, bonds, and labor), and given that the distribution of states
(wealth and productivity) and the real value of the money supply are stationary.
Definition 2 (Recursive Equilibrium). A stationary monetary recursive competitive equi-
librium is a constant real value of liquidity M¯ , an inflation rate π, a wage rate w, an interest
rate i, a set of policy functions m′ : Ω → R+, b
′ : Ω → [b,∞) and c : Ω → R+, ℓ : Ω → R+,
and an invariant probability measure Φ such that
1. Given π, i, and w, the policy functions m′(ω), b′(ω), c(ω) and ℓ(ω) for ω ∈ Ω solve the
household problem.
2. Given w, the firm demands labor L that satisfies w = F ′(L) and distributes revenues
in excess of labor compensation as dividends ξ = Y (L)− wL.
3. Markets clear:
∑
h∈H
∫
m∈M
∫
b∈B
ℓ(ω)hφ(ω)dmdb = L (money market)
∑
h∈H
∫
m∈M
∫
b∈B
πm′(ω)φ(ω)dmdb = M¯ (labor market)
∑
h∈H
∫
m∈M
∫
b∈B
c(ω)φ(ω)dm db = Y (L) (goods market)
∑
h∈H
∫
m∈M
∫
b∈B
b′(ω)φ(ω)dmdb = 0. (bonds market)
4. For all subsets B(Ω) ⊆ B(Ω), the cdf Φ′(B(Ω)) satisfies
Φ′(B(Ω)) =
∑
h
∫
m
∫
b
Q(ω,B(Ω))φ(ω)dmdb
and Φ′(B(Ω)) = Φ(B(Ω)).
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Clearly, stationary equilibrium, if it exists, is characterized by wealth and consumption
inequality because markets are incomplete (Lemma 1). In equilibrium we denote average
consumption by c¯ = Y (L) and we let m¯ denote average real money balances held at the start
of a date, with
m¯ :=
∑
h∈H
∫
m∈M
∫
b∈B
mφ(m, b, h)dmdb.
Characterization of equilibrium is an analytically intractable task because the distribution
of money and bonds, which is the key aggregate state variable, is analytically intractable.
Therefore, analysis is conducted using a computational methodology.7
4 Main Findings
This section reports findings from a computational analysis of steady states in a yearly model
parameterized to match data for the U.S. for the sample period 1950-2006. Over that period,
the average annual CPI inflation rate was 3.9% with a maximum of 14% and a minimum of
-0.7%. Parameters are selected according to the procedure discussed below.
The production function is taken to have the form Y (L) = Lα, where α is set to 0.7 as
in the standard real business cycle model. To calibrate the idiosyncratic productivity shocks
process we follow the procedure in [2]. They calibrate the shock process using estimates of
the standard deviation and correlation of productivity shocks in the U.S. reported in [18].
Because there is no aggregate shock in our model, we adapt the procedure in [2] to our model
by eliminating the counter-cyclical variation of labor income risk. In our model, the Markov
process for the log of the productivity shocks must satisfy the estimated standard deviation
std(lnh) = 0.71 and correlation ρ(ln h) = 0.87. This implies values for the idiosyncratic
productivity shock (hL, hH) = (0.1974, 0.8053) and a two-state transition matrix:

 0.935 0.065
0.065 0.935

 .
We also calibrate a separate model for the case of iid shock (i.e., where ρ(lnh) = 0).
We adopt the functions u(c) := c
1−γ
1−γ
for γ 6= 1 with u(c) := ln c for γ = 1, and g(ℓ) := ℓ
δ
δ
.
To pin down δ, note that in competitive equilibrium the wage satisfies wh = ℓδ−1, where h
7Details of the numerical procedure, which is burdensome, are described in the Supporting Materials.
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is the realization of the productivity shocks; hence the equilibrium labor supply is ℓ(w) =
(wh)
1
δ−1 . The elasticity of the labor supply with respect to the real wage is d ln ℓ(w)
d lnw
= 1
δ−1
.
Different studies use different measures; for instance, the literature on Social Security often
uses 1 as a target for labor elasticity (e.g., [14]). However, estimates of the elasticity of labor
supply vary from study to study and also according to the group considered. Following the
literature on Social Security and estimates in the recent study by [11], in the benchmark
calibration we target an elasticity of labor supply with respect to the own wage of 1, which
implies δ = 2. We also do a sensitivity analysis for two other measures of the elasticity of
labor supply with respect to the own wage: 2 and 0.5, which correspond to δ = 1.5 and 3,
respectively. Given that we work with yearly data, we set β = 0.97.
Finally, to calibrate the intertemporal elasticity of substitution parameter γ, we match
the variance of inverse velocity M
PY
in the data to that in the model. The nominal price level
P is the GDP deflator, aggregate nominal output PY is nominal GDP, and the nominal
money supply M is M1.8 The calibrated value of γ depends on the value δ. When we select
δ = 2, we obtain γ = 1.3, which is in line with values calibrated in the literature. 9
We first present results for economies where agents exclusively self-insure with money.
This facilitates comparisons with the welfare cost of the inflation literature, which is based
largely on models where money is the only asset. It also helps to clarify the role played by
bond/credit markets, which we introduce subsequently. For expositional clarity, findings are
reported as separate “Results”, and reference to stationary equilibrium and to the baseline
case are omitted when understood.
4.1 Money is the Only Available Asset
This section reports findings regarding stationary equilibrium allocations when the bond
market is shut down. This means households exclusively self-insure with money and money
8M1 is in billions of dollars, December of each year, not seasonally adjusted. For the years before 1958,
M1 data is from [12](p. 708-718, col. 7). For 1959-06, M1 is from the St. Louis Fed FRED database.
Nominal GDP is from The National Income and Product Accounts of the United States.
9Ideally, we would parameterize the model by matching the inverse velocity of money (e.g., Chiu and
Molico, 2010). However, ours is a ”pure” cash in advance model, and so money circulates less than once per
period, unlike in the data. Hence, we match the variance of inverse velocity. Although this is non-standard,
it generates γ values that are in line with the literature, which gives us confidence in the calibration. To
assess the sensitivity of the results to our choice of target, we ran the model also with other reasonable values
of γ and do not find strong differences with the specification selected (see Supporting Materials).
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balances represent the totality of savings (i.e., b = 0).
Result 1. Equilibrium exhibits endogenous inequality in income, wealth and consumption.
Wealth and consumption inequality increase with the persistence of shocks.
Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2 provide supporting evidence.10 Equilibrium inequality origi-
nates from idiosyncratic shocks to productivity. In particular, consumption inequality is tied
to market incompleteness and the stochastic process responsible for productivity shocks,
which are persistent in the baseline calibration. To understand the impact of persistence,
we computed a version of the model in which we retain the same unconditional (long-run)
mean productivity of the baseline calibration but assume iid shocks. We find that greater
persistence reduces mobility across classes of wealth because it makes sudden earnings vari-
ations unlikely; wealth accumulation slows down for poor households and speeds up for rich
households. More persistent shocks also generate a stronger desire to hold precautionary
savings, which in turn affects consumption patterns. Wealthy households deplete their sav-
ings more slowly when they incur a negative shock that is more persistent; poor households
more slowly accumulate wealth when they face a positive shock that is more persistent.11
Result 1 thus suggests that the redistributive impact of monetary policy crucially depends
on the process of earnings shocks.
Quantitatively, the money-only model—which is calibrated to match the persistence of
earning shocks in the U.S. data—can account for roughly half of the income inequality in
the U.S. data but only for one-third of the wealth inequality. In addition, the money-only
model cannot fully account for the feature that wealth is substantially more concentrated
than income. [7] report Gini coefficients for income and non-housing wealth —respectively,
0.548 and 0.861 in 1998, and 0.575 and 0.881 in 2007.
At 2% inflation, which roughly corresponds to the experience in those years, the model
generates Gini coefficients of 0.249 and 0.313 for income and wealth.
10Wealth and consumption inequality are reported across inflation rates by means of Gini coefficients and,
for 2% inflation, using Lorenz curves. A Lorenz curve represents inequality in the distribution of wealth by
reporting the cumulative share of wealth against the cumulative share of the population. A curve coinciding
with the 45-degree line corresponds to no inequality.
11Income inequality decreases with persistence (Table 1). Labor supply decisions are more extreme when
shocks are iid; highly productive households supply more labor to take advantage of their temporarily high
productivity; the opposite holds for low productivity agents. As a result, the variance of effective labor hours
is higher under iid than persistent shocks. Overall, the responses of the two types of workers do not offset
each other, so the per-capita supply of labor is higher and the wage rate lower under iid than persistent
shocks.
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Result 2. A faster rate of monetary expansion lowers income inequality and per-capita
output.
Table 1 provides supporting evidence. Income inequality primarily falls because the
monetary expansion is accomplished with lump-sum injections. Households whose wealth m
is below per capita (or average) wealth m¯ receive a net transfer (π − 1)(m¯ −m), while all
others are taxed. A faster rate of monetary expansion induces a permanent output decline
because the rate of return on money falls with inflation, which raises the opportunity cost
of savings. As the incentive to save declines, so does the incentive to supply labor. Hence,
given a labor demand that is independent of inflation, equilibrium output falls; the severity
of such a decline is a function of the labor supply elasticity. By market clearing, per capita
output equals per capita consumption, so an increment in inflation induces a permanent
decline in per-capita consumption. This decline is the key feature of representative-agent
models with production, which explains why the representative household is typically found
to be willing to give up some consumption to avoid any inflation. The message of Result 2 is
that with heterogeneity, inflation-induced output declines do not necessarily render inflation
socially undesirable because inflation also redistributes income and, as reported in the next
two results, wealth and consumption.
[Table 1 about here.]
[Figure 1 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
Result 3. Per capita wealth and wealth inequality decline nonlinearly with inflation. Small
departures from zero inflation generate the steepest declines.
The message here is that expansionary monetary policy can be a tool for redistributing
wealth. Table 1 and Figure 3 and 4 provide the evidence for this. We report that per capita
savings rapidly fall as inflation grows above zero, and then slowly decline as inflation grows
above 5% in the baseline calibration. A wealth decline occurs because the opportunity cost
of precautionary savings grows with inflation. On the one hand, inflation lowers the self-
insurance value of money, which reduces the desire to hold savings that exceed transactions
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needs (precautionary savings). Incentives to self-insure with money against earnings shocks
are maximized when the opportunity cost of money is minimized (i.e., at zero inflation).
In addition, lump-sum injections provide some insurance. Consequently, per capita wealth
monotonically falls with inflation until it equals per capita expenditure. The pattern is
nonlinear because the decline in precautionary savings is concentrated mostly among wealthy
households who, unlike poor households, have significant precautionary savings. This also
explains why wealth concentration declines, and why this decline is significant at low inflation
rates; that is, when inequality is greater (Table 1). Figure 3 illustrates this phenomenon.
[Figure 3 about here.]
[Figure 4 about here.]
Wealth inequality also declines because lump-sum money injections directly redistribute
income (Result 2). To appreciate this phenomenon, consider the trajectory of wealth by
quartiles, across inflation rates (Figure 4 and Table 1). At low inflation, we identify three
classes of households: those with a long history of similar income shocks, those who occupy
the tails of the wealth distribution, and those households “in transition” (=the middle class).
As inflation increases, precautionary savings decline; hence wealth levels increasingly reflect
the household’s most recent productivity shocks, so the middle class shrinks. From this point
on, lump-sum money creation becomes the driving force behind inflation-induced wealth
redistribution. If inflation is sufficiently high, then precautionary savings are virtually zero
(Table 1). At that point, the wealth distribution becomes bimodal because only current
earnings shocks matter, hence income and wealth inequality coincide.
In summary, two lessons have emerged so far. First, if money is the only source of
self-insurance, then increments in fully anticipated inflation not only reduce income and
wealth concentration, but also lower per capita income, output, and wealth. Second, the
impact of inflation is nonlinear: Small departures from zero inflation have the strongest
redistributive impact because the incentives to hold precautionary savings quickly vanish.
Beyond a low inflation threshold, lump-sum money creation becomes the engine of inflation-
induced redistribution. This threshold is very low in the baseline calibration; per capita
savings exceed consumption by 270% at zero inflation and by only 6% at 5% inflation.
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Results 2 and 3 might suggest that inflation necessarily reduces consumption inequality.
In fact, this is not so.
Result 4. A faster rate of monetary expansion may elevate consumption inequality.
Tables 1 and Figures 5, 6 and 8 provide supporting evidence. We show that when house-
holds can self-insure only with money, consumption inequality grows with inflation if inflation
is sufficiently low. At low rates, inflation has the potential to redistribute consumption shares
away from the middle class toward those at the wealth distribution’s tails (Figure 5). At
high rates, consumption shares are redistributed top to bottom. This non-monotone as-
sociation between inflation and consumption inequality is observed also when inequality is
lower —that is, when earnings shocks are not very persistent (Result 1 and Table 1). The
message from Result 4 is thus very simple: Inflating to decrease wealth concentration does
not necessarily imply a decrease in the concentration of consumption.
[Figure 5 about here.]
[Figure 6 about here.]
Result 4 emerges because increments in inflation generate heterogeneous wealth and sub-
stitution effects. Lump-sum money transfers do induce strong wealth effects for the poorest
households. However, inflation also unequally alters spending constraints, which are het-
erogeneously tight as a result of wealth inequality. As a result, an increase in inflation sig-
nificantly raises the marginal value of money for households with tight liquidity constraints
(poor and lower middle-class), so their consumption falls. Figure 7 illustrates this substitu-
tion effect when shocks are iid. The marginal value of money (Vm) nonlinearly declines in
wealth because it reflects both the level of wealth and the severity of the household’s liq-
uidity constraints (the multipliers µ and λ). Moving from 0% to 10% inflation substantially
increases the marginal value of money for poor households, while it minimally changes, or
slightly lowers it for everyone else. A similar pattern emerges if shocks are persistent.
[Figure 7 about here.]
In summary, if money is the only available asset, then increments in fully anticipated
inflation are sure to reduce per capita consumption and may also increase consumption
inequality. The efficiency consequences are reported next.
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Result 5. Per capita welfare is nonlinearly associated with inflation. The association is
non-monotone when shocks are persistent.
Table 2 reports the (average) welfare cost of x% inflation, as opposed to no inflation, for
different specifications of the model. Figure 8 reports welfare costs for the baseline case and
inflation up to 40%.12 The main point here is that qualitative and quantitative differences
emerge based on the persistence of shocks, and the elasticity of labor supply. In a nutshell,
labor elasticity and shocks affect the consumption mean variance trade-off associated to
long-run inflation.
[Table 2 about here.]
[Figure 8 about here.]
With iid shocks, the welfare cost (of inflation) is positive and it monotonically in-
creases with inflation (Panel B in Table 2). This is qualitatively in line with findings from
representative-agent models and some heterogeneous-agent models. Quantitatively, the wel-
fare cost is several times that found in representative agent models. With persistent shocks
the average welfare cost remains positive but it becomes non-monotone in inflation (Panel
A in Table 2); it initially increases as inflation rises above zero, then falls, and finally the
average welfare cost rises again.
This non-monotonicity suggests caution should be taken in making qualitative and quan-
titative policy assessments. First, assessing the welfare impact monetary policy based on
measurements for a few inflation targets, as is often done in the literature, can lead to trou-
bling conclusions.13 Second, with heterogeneity, the welfare impact of inflation hinges on the
money injection mechanism in meaningful ways. In a sense, assuming lump-sum injections
maximizes the possible welfare-enhancing impact of inflation, as opposed to assuming injec-
tion mechanisms that need not redistribute wealth in a socially desirable manner (e.g., open
market operations, asymmetric transfers).
12Clearly, the average welfare cost obtained by comparing the monetary allocation with the efficient alloca-
tion is always positive and large because markets are incomplete. For example, at 2% inflation with persistent
shocks, the average households would give up almost 15% consumption to be at the efficient allocation. See
the Appendix for the definitions of welfare costs.
13For instance, [13] finds that (i) there is a welfare cost of inflation, (ii) it is larger than in representative
agent models, and (iii) it is higher at 10% than at 5% inflation. However, infinite inflation is optimal in
that setting. Large inflations push the economy closer to the planner’s allocation without affecting mean
consumption (the aggregate endowment is assumed fixed).
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The non-monotonicity is even more prominent when output is less responsive to inflation
because in this case some inflation may increase welfare. For example, consider δ = 3 in
the Panel A of Table 2, which corresponds to the case where the elasticity of labor supply
is halved relative to baseline. To understand the role of the elasticity of the labor supply,
consider that a planner would be willing to dissipate some output to reduce consumption
inequality. Shock persistence and labor supply elasticity alter this trade-off between inflation-
induced output decline and redistribution. Persistent shocks magnify inequality; hence the
desirability of redistribution (Result 1): An inelastic labor supply brings the model closer to
an endowment economy where output is unresponsive to inflation (as in [1] and [13]). Hence,
a sufficiently inelastic labor supply allows moderate inflation to improve average welfare
by redistributing consumption “top to bottom” without generating excessive output declines
(Result 2). This inflation rate is generally bounded away from zero due to the initial increase
in consumption inequality (Result 4).
Table 2 also reports welfare costs by wealth quartiles. In the baseline calibration (Panel A
in Table 2, δ = 2), every household dislikes inflation except for those in the bottom quartile.
Interestingly, the welfare costs can be non-monotone across wealth levels. For instance,
households in the second quartile would give up 9% consumption to avoid 5% inflation,
which is twice what households in the next quartile would give up. This is tied to Result
4: Middle-class households lose consumption shares as inflation rises above zero. Panel B in
Table 2 shows that every household dislikes inflation when shocks are iid, because there is
less inequality than under persistent shocks.
4.2 Introducing a Credit Market
This section reports findings when we add the possibility to borrow and lend by trading risk-
free bonds. One could think of this as introducing a financial innovation.14 For comparison
purposes, the economies are calibrated to the same parameter values used before; Tables 3-5
14This is not equivalent to assuming that agents can buy some goods with cash and the rest with credit;
all consumption goods must still be purchased with cash because bonds are illiquid. However, now agents
can relax their liquidity constraints through borrowing; in this sense, there is a similarity with a “cash &
credit goods” model, where liquidity constrains are less stringent. In the computation the borrowing limit
is set to b = −6ξ, i.e., agents can borrow up to six times the dividend received in a period. The government
borrows 100% of Y so the net bond supply is B =
∫
n
bndn = Y . This is helpful for computational reasons;
it allows us to bound the model away from i = 0.
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and Figure 8 report the results. Start by observing that the introduction of a bond market
alters per capita output; with no inflation, per capita output in the bond economy is 0.9%
higher than in the money-only economy. Output is higher because demand is stronger due
to the fact that agents can now borrow to smooth their consumption. Inflation has still a
negative impact on per capita wealth and output. However, the output decline associated
with expansionary monetary policy is slower relative to the money-only economy; at 40%
inflation, output is almost 3% higher than in the money-only economy. In other words, with
the introduction of bonds the price of inflation—in terms of lost output—declines.
Equilibrium is still characterized by endogenous wealth and consumption inequality be-
cause the introduction of debt securities is not sufficient to complete the market. Importantly,
introducing a bond market alters both the composition and the distribution of portfolios in
a meaningful way.
Result 6. When money is not the only asset, the liquidity of portfolios declines with inflation
and the household’s wealth.
Table 3 provides evidence on how the financial innovation we have considered affects the
composition of portfolios. When households can self-insure with money and bonds, they
reduce their exposure to the inflation tax by minimizing their money balances and holding
bonds, hence the illiquid share of savings increases with inflation.
[Table 3 about here.]
Illiquid bonds form the bulk of precautionary savings because bonds dominate money in
rate of return (Lemma 1). Consequently, money has primarily a transactions role. Since
wealthy agents hold the bulk of precautionary savings, the monetary share of portfolios
declines in the household’s wealth. In the benchmark calibration, for instance, households in
the bottom wealth quartile choose for their entire holdings only money to use for transactions
purposes. This finding is qualitatively in line with U.S. data from the Survey of Consumer
Finances, which reports that poor households hold essentially cash. We next report how these
features alter the distribution of endogenous variables and, consequently, the distributional
impact of inflation, relative to the model without money.
Result 7. Consumption inequality is lower and wealth inequality is greater when households
can access a credit market, as opposed to when they cannot.
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Table 4 provides supporting evidence.
[Table 4 about here.]
Introducing the option to borrow and lend improves risk-sharing, which in equilibrium
lowers consumption inequality, therefore raising average welfare. Wealth inequality primarily
increases relative to the money-only economy because poor households now can borrow.
Because precautionary savings are now mostly composed of bonds (Result 6), per capita
money balances more closely track per capita consumption, unlike the money-only economy.15
The point here is that observing an increase in wealth concentration should not lead us to
conclude that consumption has also become more skewed.
Introducing a bond market is a step in the right direction in terms of obtaining con-
centration measures closer to U.S. data. At 2% inflation, we obtain Gini coefficients 0.280
and 0.732 for income and wealth. The first measure still falls short in matching the income
concentration in the data, but wealth concentration now accounts for about 85% of that
observed in the data for 1998. As a result, the ratio of concentrations in wealth and income
exceeds that in the data.16
The possibility to self-insure with interest-bearing assets has important implications for
inflation-induced redistributions and the welfare cost of inflation.
Result 8. When money is not the only asset, a faster rate of monetary expansion reduces
consumption inequality but does not decrease wealth inequality.
Financial innovation weakens the redistributive impact of inflation. Table 4 provides sup-
porting evidence. When households can trade bonds, money plays a minor role in consump-
tion smoothing, which makes inflation less effective in redistributing wealth. An increment
in the money growth rate may increase wealth inequality because households can borrow to
relax increasingly tight liquidity constraints. In addition, because monetary shares decline
15Consumption is more dispersed than money holdings because money is partially used for precautionary
purposes. Most individuals hold small money balances. However, the liquidity of their asset portfolios
differs. Individuals who are not very wealthy hold mostly liquid assets and may not spend their entire
money balances, holding some for precautionary purposes. As inflation increases, money is never held for
precautionary purposes; hence the Gini coefficients of consumption and money holdings become identical.
16In order to match the data better, households in the model should be given the possibility to over
accumulate wealth, or experience substantial wealth losses. An alternative, is to consider financial market
access constraints as in [5].
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in wealth, a monetary expansion amounts to imposing a regressive tax on wealth. Con-
sumption inequality monotonically falls with a faster rate of money growth for two primary
reasons. First, money is injected via lump sum, which is a very effective way to reduce
income inequality (Result 2). Second, the availability of a bond market allows households to
relax increasingly binding spending constraints through borrowing. Clearly, when shocks are
not persistent, inequality is already small so inflation-induced consumption redistribution is
minimal. The availability of a credit market also has implications for the impact of inflation
on average welfare, which we summarize as follows.
Result 9. When shocks are persistent and the labor supply is inelastic, expansionary mon-
etary policy may raise average welfare.
Table 5 provides supporting evidence. Introducing a bond market generally lowers the
average welfare cost of inflation because households can better self-insure and can also par-
tially shield their precautionary savings from the inflation tax. As a consequence, the positive
redistributive effect of lump-sum money injections is heightened. Whether inflation improves
average welfare depends on the specifics of the economy in terms of shocks and labor supply.
With iid shocks, the welfare cost of inflation is positive and it monotonically increases
with inflation (Panel B in Table 5). In this case, the associated inflation-welfare cost is
qualitatively comparable to that observed in the economy where money in the only asset
(Panel B in Table 2), but the welfare cost is now quantitatively smaller. For instance,
moving from 10% to no inflation was worth 3.67% consumption in the money-only economy,
while it is worth only 0.07% in the economy with bonds. The message here is that the
economy with money, bonds, and iid shocks is qualitatively and quantitatively in line with
representative-agent model findings.
[Table 5 about here.]
With persistent shocks, the average welfare cost is non-monotone; this is consistent with
Result 5. However, now some inflation may improve average welfare, and this may occur
when the concentration of wealth also increases (Panel A in Table 5). For example, the
average household in the money-only economy would give up 5.3% consumption to avoid
10% inflation, but would request 1.11% additional consumption in the bond economy, even
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if wealth is more concentrated than at zero inflation. The welfare cost is U-shaped because
inflation reduces both per capita output and income inequality. The first (negative) effect
is dominated by the second (positive) at low inflation rates if the labor supply is sufficiently
inelastic and shocks are persistent. In this case, income redistribution benefits a majority of
households.
To see this, note that now the wealthiest households may also prefer some inflation
(Panel A in Table 5, δ = 2). The reason is simple: Unlike the money-only economy, wealthy
households can now avoid the inflation tax by holding illiquid portfolios. In addition, lump-
sum money injections provide some insurance against earnings risk, which can be valuable
enough to overcome any decrease in current utility from lower consumption and less leisure.
The value of this “additional” insurance increases with the persistence in earning shocks.17
Qualitatively, these findings hold when households can trade bonds—hence can borrow—
after productivity shocks are realized and before the good market opens. In this case, con-
straints no longer bind for anyone, unless money and bonds are equivalent assets or house-
holds can borrow insufficient amounts (see Supporting Materials). Clearly, since households
can fully relax their liquidity constraints through borrowing, we expect less inequality, hence
somewhat weaker results. Indeed, when we calibrate the model to the same parameters
used before, we find that consumption inequality is lower, and dispersion in money holdings
simply reflects income disparities; no differences in qualitative results emerge.
4.3 The model with capital
In this section we extend the model to include physical capital to understand whether and
how long-run adjustment in the capital/labor ratio—which are brought about by changes in
long-run inflation—alter the distributional impact of inflation.
17There are variations in current utility and continuation utility as inflation increases. Inflation distorts
labor supply decisions. With higher inflation all households supply less labor. Lump sum injections of money
also decrease income inequality. As a result, current utility increases for the poor, because they consume
more and work less. The welfare gain for the poor is significant because of their high marginal utility of
consumption. Their continuation utility also increases. On the other hand, the rich suffer a current utility
loss because they consume less but not very much. This utility loss is limited because the rich have a low
marginal utility of consumption and a high marginal utility of leisure. Moreover, the rich’s continuation
utility may increase because the continuation utility from going to a low productivity state is now higher.
Hence, the improvement in continuation utility can outweigh the loss in current utility, in which case the
rich can also benefit from higher inflation.
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Let aggregate output be produced by a representative firm with the CRS technology
Y (Kt, Lt) = K
1
3
t L
2
3
t . The aggregate capital stock Kt is endogenously determined. Assuming
a constant depreciation rate δd (set to 10% in the computation) and denoting by It aggregate
investment on date t, the law of motion for capital is Kt+1 = (1− δd)Kt+ It. In each period
t the firm choose (Lt, Kt) to maximize profit Y (Kt, Lt)− wtLt − rtKt, where rt denotes the
rental rate. Clearly, ∂Y (Kt,Lt)
∂Lt
= wt and
∂Y (Kt,Lt)
∂Kt
= rt. Hence, in equilibrium firms make zero
profits and so households receive no lump-sum transfer ξ from the firm.
Now the household can save with money and also with two illiquid assets—bonds and
capital. If we let m, k ≥ 0 and b ≥ b > −∞ denote the household’s holdings of money,
capital and bonds (all defined in real terms) at the start of a period, then the household’s
budget constraints is
c+ π(m′ + b′) + k′ ≤ wℓh+ (r + 1− δd)k +m+ bi+ τ,
where nominal variables have been normalized by the contemporaneous nominal price of
goods.18 Since there are no aggregate shocks, capital and bonds must have identical real
return in equilibrium, i.e.,
r + 1− δd =
i
π
.
As a result, in stationary equilibrium households must be indifferent between holding capital
or bonds because these two assets have the same return and are identically illiquid. Hence,
if we let ω := k
π
+ b denote the household’s non-monetary wealth, the budget constraint can
be rewritten as
c+ π(m′ + ω′) ≤ wℓh+m+ ωi+ τ.
Given (m,ω, h) and a fully anticipated inflation rate π, the household’s problem is to choose
(c, ℓ,m′, ω′) ≥ 0 and ω′ ≥ b > −∞ to maximize expected lifetime utility. The problem has
18In the computation we set b = −6rK, i.e., the household can borrow up to six times the share of capital
income, which is in line with the assumption made in the bond economy (one can think the bond economy
as one in which the capital stock is exogenously fixed at unity, hence the share of capital income is simply
the dividend). The government still borrows 100% of Y .
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the usual recursive representation
V (m,ω, h) = max{u(c)− g(ℓ) + βEV (m′, ω′, h′)}
s.t. c + π(m′ + ω′) ≤ wℓh+m+ ωi+ τ,
c ≤ m,
This problem is identical to the one studied in Section 3.2. The only difference is a variable
redefinition; we have ω instead of b. Hence, expressions (2)-(6) and Lemma 1 still hold, with
the appropriate variable change.
Market clearing conditions now include the capital market, i.e.,
Kt =
∫
n
kn,tdn = π
∫
n
(ωn,t − bn,t)dn.
In this model inflation affects the degree of heterogeneity in the economy through the capital
formation process, in addition to the other channels. Capital formation matters because it
affects the marginal product of labor, hence the incentives to work. The open question is
whether this additional channel significantly alters the results that emerged when households
can only access a bond market.
To answer this question we calibrate the model with capital to the same parameter values
used before; Tables 6-7 and Figure 8 report the results. The analysis reveals that the results
are broadly in line with those reported in the previous section, with some differences, which
we report next.
Income inequality is greater now that households can access a capital market, as opposed
to when they could not (Table 6). Introducing a capital market is a step in the right direction
to get income concentration closer to the recent U.S. experience. At 2% inflation, we obtain
Gini coefficients 0.415 for income, under persistent shocks (roughly 75% of that observed
in 1998). The ratio of wealth to income concentration is also much closer to the data than
in the bond economy (1.57 in 1998). Wealth inequality, however, is not high enough—a
common problem in the literature.
[Table 6 about here.]
The reason for the increase in income inequality is due to a marked change in the compo-
sition of portfolios and, therefore, in the distribution of capital income. Now that households
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can access a market for capital, portfolios of all but the poorest households are significantly
more illiquid than in the bond economy (Table 7). The shift to illiquid assets is especially
pronounced for households in the middle of the wealth distribution; the poorest, still hold no
precautionary savings and simply hold cash. This also helps us to understand why wealth
inequality is less pronounced than in the bond economy: a greater portion of households
(those in the middle of the distribution) accumulates wealth.
[Table 7 about here.]
There are a few other features that are noteworthy. First, the equilibrium real interest
rate is close to but slightly higher than in the model without capital, for inflation rates
consistent with the U.S. experience post WWII. Second, the model does not generate a Tobin
effect, i.e., greater steady state inflation is not associated to greater capital accumulation.
This is interesting because one could imagine that households would more aggressively seek
safety in capital assets as inflation increases. But this does not happen in the model, so
that the impact of inflation on consumption and on average welfare remains in line with
what we reported in Result 9 (Figure 8). In particular, we still find that when shocks are
persistent and the labor supply is inelastic, expansionary monetary policy may still raise
average welfare even if it lowers per capita consumption and even if it reduces welfare of the
wealthier segment of society (see also Tables in Supplementary Materials).
5 Final Comments
This study has shown that whether inflation can be used as an instrument to improve social
welfare crucially depends on the persistence of shocks to earnings, financial structure, and
the elasticity of labor supply. Persistent shocks magnify inequality, hence the desirability
of redistributive policies from an average welfare perspective. The financial structure de-
termines the extent to which households with different wealth use money for self-insurance
purposes, which has implications for how effectively inflation can redistribute wealth. The
elasticity of labor supply affects the inflation-induced output loss.
In the model, long-run inflation results from fully anticipated lump sum money transfers.
When households can self-insure only with money, increments in inflation have been shown to
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reduce wealth disparities. However, this does not necessarily make inflation socially desirable.
In fact, we report that inflation can increase consumption inequality. When agents can access
a credit market and can choose the composition of their portfolios–bonds and money, or also
capital—inflation becomes ineffective at redistributing wealth. Overall, we report that—
when we compare steady states of an annual model calibrated to U.S. data— a faster rate of
fully anticipated monetary expansion may increase average welfare if shocks are persistent
and the labor supply is inelastic.
Additional intuition could be gathered by studying the model when money creation is
the result of open market operations and credit markets are not equally accessible to every
household.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Start by noticing that u′(c)− λ = µ > 0, hence u′(c) > λ ≥ 0. This
follows from local non-satiation of preferences, so the budget constraint holds with equality
and µ > 0. To prove that m′ > 0 for everyone we derive a contradiction. Suppose m′ = 0
for someone. From
−π[u′(c)− λ] + βE[u′(c′)] ≤ 0 (with = if m′ > 0)
−π[u′(c)− λ] + βE[u′(c′)− λ′]i ≤ 0 (with = if b′ > b).
(1)
optimality requires
−π[u′(c)− λ] + βE[u′(0)] ≤ 0,
which is violated because u′(c)− λ > 0 and u′(0) =∞.
To prove that λ > 0 for at least someone use a proof by contradiction. Suppose λ = 0
for everyone. Then
u′(c) =
β
π
E[u′(c′)] + λ (2)
implies u′(c) = β
π
E[u′(c′)] for all households. Hence, current consumption is never constrained
by monetary savings. This means that every household on average accumulates wealth, at
least in some state. But this is suboptimal. They could spend some of it and improve their
utility. This gives us the desired contradiction. Hence, λ > 0 for at least some agents, those
with low money holdings.
To prove that if i ≤ 1, then b′ = b we also use a contradiction. Let m′ > 0 (money is
saved). Suppose b′ > b and i < 1. Then from
i =
E[u′(c′)]
E[u′(c′)− λ′ ]
. (3)
we have E[u
′(c′)]
E[u′(c′)−λ′ ]
= i < 1, which is impossible because λ′ ≥ 0. If i = 1, then money and
bonds have the same return. Hence, if λ′ > 0 in some state, then once again we derive a
contradiction from Equation (3). and if λ′ = 0 then money and bonds are identical assets,
since the cash-in-advance constraint is not binding. Hence b′ = b is optimal.
Finally let i > 1 and m′ > 0. Suppose b′ > b. From Equation (3) we need E[λ′] > 0.
Quantifying the Average Welfare Cost of Inflation
Fixing π, let cπ(ω), ℓπ(ω), m
′
π(ω) and b
′
π(ω) denote the optimal choices of a household in
state ω := (m, b, h). Let ω′ := (m′π, b
′
π, h
′) denote the state resulting from the current savings
choices m′π(ω) and b
′
π(ω). Equilibrium welfare for this household is defined by Vπ(ω) with
Vπ(ω) := u(cπ(ω))− g(ℓπ(ω)) + βEVπ(ω
′)
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so that average welfare is Wπ with
Wπ :=
∑
h
∫
m
∫
b
Vπ(ω)φ(ω)dmdb (4)
Inflation π affects average welfare Wπ in two ways. Inflation redistributes monetary wealth
thanks to inequalities in the inflation tax (π−1)(m¯−m). There is no redistribution if π = 1
(no inflation). For all π > 1, monetary wealth is redistributed from those who have balances
above average to those who have below-average balances. Redistribution under a deflation
goes in the opposite direction. Second, inflation distorts savings decisions m′π and b
′
π and
spending decisions cπ. In particular, inflation affects average consumption because aggregate
output Y (L) depends on individual labor supply decisions ℓπ(ω), which are a function of real
wages as well as the individual state ω.
The welfare cost of π > β inflation for a household with wealth ω is a standard compen-
sating variation measure. It is the percentage adjustment in consumption that leaves the
household indifferent, ex-ante, between inflation π and a lower rate z ≥ β. Given that con-
sumption is adjusted by the proportion ∆¯z in each period, and hours worked are unaltered,
define the “compensated” value function Vˆz(ω) by
Vˆz(ω) := u(∆ˆzcz(ω))− g(ℓz(ω)) + βEVˆz(ω
′)
For a household in state ω, the welfare cost of z inflation, as opposed to π, is the value
∆z = 1 − ∆ˆz that satisfies Vπ(ω) = Vˆz(ω). If ∆z > 0, then this household is indifferent
between π inflation or z inflation with consumption reduced by ∆z percent.
In the numerical analysis we calculate average welfare cost ex-ante. It is the compen-
sating variation from an ex-ante perspective, i.e., defining
Wˆz :=
∑
h
∫
m
∫
b
Vˆz(ω)φ(ω)dmdb,
for a household at time zero the welfare cost of z inflation, as opposed to π, is the value
∆z = 1− ∆ˆz that satisfies Wπ = Wˆz. If ∆z > 0, then every household is ex-ante indifferent
between π inflation or z inflation with consumption reduced by ∆z percent. One can think
of this as the percentage of consumption that the household would commit to give up, at
the start of the economy, in order to be at π inflation instead of z.
The ex-post average welfare cost of inflation is
∆¯z :=
∑
h
∫
m
∫
b
∆z(ω)φ(ω)dmdb,
where the notation ∆z(ω) makes explicit that welfare costs of inflation are state-dependent,
hence differ across households.
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Table 1: Money-Only Economy
Persistent Shocks IID Shocks
π − 1 m c Ginic Ginim GiniI m c Ginic Ginim GiniI
0% 2.507 0.897 0.202 0.376 0.274 1.960 0.954 0.091 0.222 0.317
1% 1.843 0.890 0.210 0.347 0.259 1.767 0.947 0.100 0.218 0.309
2% 1.454 0.884 0.215 0.313 0.249 1.633 0.941 0.108 0.215 0.302
3% 1.201 0.880 0.220 0.277 0.242 1.533 0.936 0.115 0.212 0.296
4% 1.028 0.877 0.224 0.241 0.236 1.455 0.931 0.121 0.210 0.290
5% 0.928 0.874 0.226 0.214 0.232 1.394 0.926 0.126 0.208 0.285
10% 0.891 0.860 0.219 0.208 0.223 1.205 0.904 0.143 0.197 0.264
15% 0.870 0.848 0.212 0.206 0.215 1.105 0.886 0.151 0.190 0.247
20% 0.853 0.836 0.205 0.202 0.208 1.026 0.870 0.160 0.181 0.233
25% 0.840 0.826 0.199 0.196 0.202 0.967 0.856 0.167 0.174 0.221
30% 0.828 0.816 0.194 0.191 0.195 0.932 0.843 0.167 0.171 0.211
35% 0.817 0.807 0.188 0.186 0.190 0.904 0.830 0.165 0.170 0.203
40% 0.807 0.799 0.183 0.181 0.184 0.883 0.819 0.162 0.168 0.195
Note: γ = 1.3 and δ = 2; π − 1 is the net inflation rate; x is the mean value, and Ginix is the Gini coefficient associated
to the equilibrium random variable x. We define m = money balances (in real terms), c = consumption, I = income net of
taxes/transfers, b = bonds balances (in real terms), wealth is w = m+ b
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Table 2: Distribution of Welfare Costs in Money-Only Economy
Panel A: Persistent Shocks
δ = 1.5 δ = 2 δ = 3
π − 1 ∆pi ∆pi Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 ∆pi
0% 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1% 2.213 1.674 −0.786 2.219 2.061 3.328 1.302
2% 4.155 3.143 −0.866 4.103 3.266 6.126 2.455
3% 5.866 4.438 −0.582 6.029 3.802 8.355 3.461
4% 7.389 5.569 −0.168 8.373 3.533 10.113 4.346
5% 8.739 6.300 0.096 9.020 4.281 11.251 4.336
10% 8.392 5.348 −0.918 7.856 3.827 10.888 3.373
15% 7.496 4.451 −1.821 6.739 3.479 10.388 2.499
20% 6.670 3.705 −2.636 5.833 3.184 10.053 1.774
25% 6.028 3.090 −3.284 5.000 3.014 9.776 1.185
30% 5.542 2.615 −3.783 4.289 2.912 9.631 0.711
35% 5.183 2.241 −4.219 3.725 2.884 9.547 0.307
40% 4.889 1.945 −4.571 3.230 2.888 9.533 −0.035
Panel B: IID Shocks
δ = 1.5 δ = 2 δ = 3
π − 1 ∆pi ∆pi Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 ∆pi
0% 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1% 0.641 0.522 0.183 0.417 0.601 0.882 0.419
2% 1.220 0.998 0.423 0.793 1.164 1.603 0.794
3% 1.759 1.432 0.668 1.119 1.722 2.200 1.129
4% 2.266 1.833 0.928 1.510 2.078 2.790 1.427
5% 2.750 2.196 1.203 1.855 2.441 3.250 1.688
10% 4.710 3.668 2.358 3.374 3.768 5.097 2.753
15% 6.169 4.748 3.252 4.472 4.755 6.411 3.560
20% 7.753 5.989 4.302 5.733 5.924 7.851 4.538
25% 9.455 7.103 5.255 6.875 6.991 9.104 5.181
30% 10.536 7.763 5.813 7.573 7.651 9.813 5.430
35% 11.394 8.322 6.292 8.167 8.227 10.383 5.664
40% 12.034 8.764 6.655 8.637 8.664 10.874 5.902
Note: γ = 1.3 and δ = 2 unless otherwise noted; π−1 is the net inflation rate. The welfare cost ∆pi is reported as the percent of
current consumption the average household would give up to be at zero inflation (two-digit approximation; a negative number
indicates a welfare gain). Qi denotes the i-th quartile of the wealth distribution.
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Table 3: Money/Total Asset Ratios by Wealth Quartiles
π − 1 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
0% 1.000 0.919 0.403 0.250
1% 1.000 0.907 0.393 0.250
2% 1.000 0.900 0.392 0.251
3% 1.000 0.902 0.393 0.251
4% 1.000 0.902 0.393 0.251
5% 1.000 0.901 0.393 0.250
10% 1.000 0.902 0.395 0.248
15% 1.000 0.905 0.397 0.246
20% 1.000 0.907 0.397 0.244
25% 1.000 0.907 0.397 0.242
30% 1.000 0.906 0.398 0.241
35% 1.000 0.905 0.399 0.240
40% 1.000 0.901 0.400 0.240
Note: The table is drawn for the benchmark calibration of persistent shocks with γ = 1.3 and δ = 2; π − 1 is the net inflation
rate. Columns 2-5 report the average real money balances divided by the average total assets held by households in each of the
four wealth quartiles; this ratio varies from 0 to 1.
Table 4: Money and Bonds Economy
Persistent Shocks IID Shocks
π − 1 m c Ginic Giniw Ginim GiniI m c Ginic Giniw Ginim GiniI
0% 0.980 0.906 0.191 0.724 0.158 0.287 0.988 0.968 0.055 0.446 0.042 0.332
1% 0.939 0.902 0.190 0.732 0.173 0.283 0.979 0.965 0.055 0.448 0.044 0.329
2% 0.917 0.899 0.189 0.736 0.183 0.281 0.972 0.962 0.054 0.448 0.045 0.326
3% 0.908 0.896 0.188 0.739 0.185 0.278 0.966 0.959 0.054 0.448 0.047 0.323
4% 0.903 0.894 0.186 0.741 0.185 0.276 0.962 0.956 0.053 0.447 0.048 0.320
5% 0.900 0.891 0.185 0.740 0.184 0.274 0.957 0.953 0.053 0.446 0.048 0.317
10% 0.885 0.879 0.179 0.738 0.179 0.264 0.941 0.939 0.051 0.440 0.049 0.302
15% 0.873 0.868 0.173 0.737 0.173 0.255 0.927 0.926 0.049 0.437 0.049 0.289
20% 0.861 0.858 0.168 0.736 0.168 0.247 0.915 0.915 0.047 0.435 0.047 0.277
25% 0.850 0.849 0.163 0.734 0.163 0.239 0.903 0.903 0.046 0.436 0.046 0.266
30% 0.841 0.840 0.158 0.731 0.158 0.231 0.893 0.893 0.044 0.436 0.044 0.256
35% 0.832 0.831 0.154 0.729 0.154 0.224 0.883 0.883 0.043 0.437 0.043 0.247
40% 0.824 0.823 0.150 0.724 0.150 0.217 0.873 0.873 0.042 0.439 0.042 0.238
Note: γ = 1.3 and δ = 2; π − 1 is the net inflation rate; x is the mean value, and Ginix is the Gini coefficient associated
to the equilibrium random variable x. We define m = money balances (in real terms), c = consumption, I = income net of
taxes/transfers, b = bonds balances (in real terms), wealth is w = m+ b
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Table 5: Distribution of Welfare Costs in Bond Economy
Panel A: Persistent Shocks
δ = 1.5 δ = 2 δ = 3
π − 1 ∆pi ∆pi Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 ∆pi
0% 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1% 0.029 −0.039 −0.206 0.083 −0.045 0.097 −0.049
2% 0.027 −0.078 −0.331 0.109 −0.046 0.117 −0.122
3% −0.058 −0.171 −0.495 0.099 −0.080 0.049 −0.242
4% −0.147 −0.306 −0.671 −0.017 −0.150 −0.018 −0.376
5% −0.331 −0.471 −0.891 −0.157 −0.278 −0.058 −0.527
10% −1.029 −1.109 −1.741 −0.847 −0.462 −0.334 −1.097
15% −1.553 −1.588 −2.491 −1.352 −0.515 −0.494 −1.583
20% −1.951 −1.949 −3.031 −1.832 −0.491 −0.578 −1.942
25% −2.221 −2.196 −3.446 −2.128 −0.427 −0.634 −2.222
30% −2.392 −2.390 −3.763 −2.392 −0.493 −0.522 −2.433
35% −2.481 −2.494 −4.036 −2.567 −0.421 −0.371 −2.599
40% −2.515 −2.571 −4.269 −2.668 −0.324 −0.278 −2.691
Panel B: IID Shocks
δ = 1.5 δ = 2 δ = 3
π − 1 ∆pi ∆pi Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 ∆pi
0% 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1% 0.012 0.021 0.029 0.028 0.007 0.022 0.004
2% 0.041 0.026 0.052 0.026 0.002 0.033 0.008
3% 0.060 0.042 0.089 0.028 0.029 0.034 0.010
4% 0.076 0.049 0.071 0.027 0.037 0.079 0.017
5% 0.101 0.069 0.086 0.042 0.057 0.113 0.019
10% 0.238 0.152 0.103 0.103 0.172 0.266 0.075
15% 0.422 0.278 0.193 0.237 0.363 0.368 0.123
20% 0.657 0.437 0.352 0.415 0.543 0.496 0.245
25% 0.931 0.648 0.574 0.637 0.804 0.638 0.377
30% 1.254 0.890 0.838 0.904 1.093 0.785 0.531
35% 1.607 1.158 1.111 1.196 1.409 0.976 0.691
40% 1.992 1.464 1.418 1.559 1.733 1.203 0.918
Note: γ = 1.3 and δ = 2 unless otherwise noted; π−1 is the net inflation rate. The welfare cost ∆pi is reported as the percent of
current consumption the average household would give up to be at zero inflation (two-digit approximation; a negative number
indicates a welfare gain). Qi denotes the i-th quartile of the wealth distribution.
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Table 6: Gini Coefficients in the economy with Capital
Persistent Shocks IID Shocks
π − 1 Ginic Giniw Ginim GiniI Ginic Giniw Ginim GiniI
0% 0.206 0.528 0.157 0.425 0.054 0.340 0.047 0.489
1% 0.205 0.530 0.179 0.420 0.054 0.340 0.049 0.484
2% 0.205 0.531 0.195 0.415 0.054 0.340 0.050 0.479
3% 0.204 0.532 0.202 0.411 0.054 0.339 0.051 0.473
4% 0.202 0.533 0.202 0.408 0.054 0.340 0.051 0.468
5% 0.201 0.534 0.201 0.404 0.053 0.340 0.051 0.463
10% 0.196 0.538 0.195 0.388 0.052 0.342 0.052 0.440
15% 0.191 0.543 0.191 0.372 0.052 0.346 0.051 0.419
20% 0.186 0.547 0.186 0.358 0.051 0.350 0.050 0.400
25% 0.182 0.551 0.181 0.345 0.050 0.355 0.049 0.383
30% 0.177 0.553 0.177 0.333 0.049 0.359 0.049 0.367
35% 0.173 0.555 0.173 0.321 0.048 0.363 0.048 0.352
40% 0.169 0.557 0.169 0.311 0.047 0.367 0.047 0.339
Note: γ = 1.3 and δ = 2; π − 1 is the net inflation rate; x is the mean value, and Ginix is the Gini coefficient associated
to the equilibrium random variable x. We define m = money balances (in real terms), c = consumption, I = income net of
taxes/transfers, wealth is w = m+ ω
Table 7: Money/Total Asset Ratios by Wealth Quartiles in the economy with Capital
π − 1 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
0% 1.000 0.283 0.145 0.106
1% 1.000 0.270 0.142 0.107
2% 1.000 0.267 0.144 0.108
3% 1.000 0.270 0.145 0.108
4% 1.000 0.272 0.145 0.109
5% 1.000 0.275 0.146 0.109
10% 1.000 0.284 0.151 0.111
15% 1.000 0.296 0.155 0.113
20% 1.000 0.308 0.160 0.114
25% 1.000 0.319 0.164 0.116
30% 1.000 0.328 0.168 0.118
35% 1.000 0.338 0.172 0.120
40% 1.000 0.346 0.176 0.122
Note: The table is drawn for the benchmark calibration of persistent shocks with γ = 1.3 and δ = 2; π − 1 is the net inflation
rate. Columns 2-5 report the average real money balances divided by the average total assets held by households in each of the
four wealth quartiles; this ratio varies from 0 to 1.
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Figure 1: Lorenz Curve for Wealth
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Notes: Lorenz curves are reported for stationary equilibrium at 2% inflation, baseline case (money only economy, persistent
shocks, δ = 2). The associated Gini coefficients are .215 and .313 for the case of iid and persistent shocks, respectively—Table
1.
Figure 2: Lorenz Curve for Consumption
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Notes: Lorenz curves are reported for stationary equilibrium at 2% inflation, baseline case (money only economy, persistent
shocks, δ = 2). The associated Gini coefficients are .108 and .215 for the case of iid and persistent shocks, respectively—Table
1.
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Figure 3: Distribution of Wealth in Money Only Economy
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Notes: The figure reports statistics regarding the distribution of money for inflation rates ranging from 0% to 50%, in single-digit
increments, for the baseline case (money only economy, persistent shocks, δ = 2). Statistics reported are: mean balances, average
balances held by households in the top and in the bottom percentile of the wealth distribution, and Gini coefficient (scale on
right vertical axis). Non-housing wealth Gini coefficients for the U.S. in 1998 and 2007 were 0.861 and 0.881, respectively—see [7]
.
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Figure 4: Quartiles of Wealth in Money Only Economy
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Notes: The figure reports the equilibrium wealth level by quartiles of wealth , for inflation rates ranging from 0% to 50%, in
single-digit increments, for the baseline case (money only economy, persistent shocks, δ = 2). The figure provides an illustration
of how inequality develops with inflation. As inflation reaches 5%, the wealth distribution becomes bimodal: agents with
below-average wealth hold similar balances, and those with more-than-average wealth hold more than twice as many balances.
The figure also illustrates the nonlinear association between inflation and wealth inequality.
Figure 5: Consumption by Quartile of Wealth in Money Only Economy
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Notes: The figure reports the equilibrium consumption level by quartiles of wealth , for inflation rates ranging from 0% to 50%,
in single-digit increments, for the baseline case (money only economy, persistent shocks, δ = 2).
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Figure 6: Gini Coefficients of Consumption and Wealth
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Notes: The figure reports the Gini coefficients of consumption and wealth for the baseline case (money only economy, persistent
shocks, δ = 2). Consumption and wealth inequality do not necessarily move in the same direction as inflation increases.
Figure 7: Marginal Value of Money
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Notes: The figure reports the equilibrium marginal value of money by percentile of wealth, for inflation rates of 0% (solid line)
and 10% (dashed line), for the baseline case (money only economy, persistent shocks, δ = 2). The values reported are averages
for two consecutive percentiles of wealth.
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Figure 8: Welfare Costs of Inflation
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Notes: The figure reports the average welfare cost of x% inflation as opposed to no inflation for inflation rates ranging from 0%
to 40%. In the legend “Money Only” refers to the economy with only money, “Money and Bond” refers to the economy with
bonds, and “Capital” refers to the economy where capital is also added. IID and Persistent differentiate between the two types
of shocks considered.
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